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DO LAWYERS PLAY WHILE VICTIMS
PAY WHEN CORPORATIONS DISCHARGE
TOXIC TORT LIABILITY IN BANKRUPTCY?*
[M]y days at Manville were in the finishing department . . . cutting as-
bestos, bagging asbestos, crushing asbestos, speaking to my friends with
asbestos, and everything we did in that plant was asbestos. As the sun
would shine through the skylight, all you could see was [sic] millions of
particles that would glitter. We would pick out asbestos from our coffee,
the larger pieces . . . fell in our sandwiches . . . or . . . we drank [them].
[Now] our lives have been destroyed.
[The] industry knew of the ills caused by asbestos. They used us like
a bunch of diseased prostitutes . . . To them it meant nothing . . . . We
took their ills home to our families. My wife is fifty-four years old [and]
[n]ever worked a day in the plant. [She] looked to ... the near future
after raising her children that she too could enjoy life. [But she] is also a
victim . . . . My son, thirty-one, is also a victim . . . . We paid our own
medical bills because of someone else's greed that placed profit over human
life. What was their excuse?,
INTRODUCTION
The recent bankruptcies of the largest United States asbestos manufacturers
emanate from the staggering volume of asbestos litigation in this country.
Major newspapers and legal periodicals have reported the substantial expenses
related to asbestos litigation. 2 A trial initiated by the Manville Corporation
* One asbestos victim protested outside a courtroom in which billions of dollars worth
of disputed insurance claims were at stake. The picket sign observed that "Lawyers Play While
Victims Pay." TIME, Mar. 18, 1985, at 67.
1. Hearings on the Hazards of Asbestos Exposure Before the Subcommittee of Commerce,
Transportation, and Tourism of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess. 43 (1982) (statement of Ted Kowalski).
2. Mitchell, Manville's Bid to Evade Avalanche of Lawsuits Proves Disappointing: Chapter
II Filing Will Result in High Costs for Years; Victims Still Get Nothing, Wall St. J., July 15,
1986, at 1, col. 6. Mitchell reports, "While Manville has paid attorneys and others during the
reorganization some $40 million, victims and their widows haven't received a dime from Manville
because the bankruptcy filing froze the litigation." Id. at 21, cols. 3-5 [hereinafter cited as
Victims Get Nothing]. Chen, Asbestos Litigation Is A Growth Industry, ATL. MAG., July 1984,
at 24 (citing Rand Corp. study reporting that asbestos victims received $236 million in com-
pensation where lawyers on both sides received $764 million, including $395 million to fight
claims for victims who received nothing); Gibson, When Lawyers Prosper, FORBES, Mar. 30,
1981, at 44 (statement of Manville's counsel: "I'd characterize [asbestos health suits] as lawyers'
cases, not true disability cases"; contingency fees consume nearly 55% of settlements, for every
dollar paid to plaintiffs, two to three times that amount goes for legal defense fees); Manville
Should End the Nightmare, Bus. WK., Dec. 10, 1984, at 166 (over two-thirds of money spent
on claims paid to lawyers). Other sources indicate that only ten to twenty cents per dollar paid
by defendants goes to asbestos victims. The balance goes to the lawyers and insurance companies.
4 ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. (Andrews) 861 (Apr. 23, 1982). See also Rowland, The Asbestos Battle,
THE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Sept. 1982, at 345 (eighty-one cents in legal fees for every dollar
paid on a claim).
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(Manville) and four additional asbestos manufacturers against fifty insurance
companies began in San Fransisco on March 5, 1985.1 The parties disputed
billions of dollars of insurance claims.4 One year was required to locate a
trial site because no existing courtroom could hold all the lawyers. Finally,
an old high school auditorium was remodeled into a courtroom, at a cost
to the parties of $200,000. Computers, which cost an additional $200,000,
were installed to accommodate over one hundred million pages of documents.
The lawyers flipped switches at twenty-six separate tables to illuminate lights
at the judge's console when they wished to speak. The auditorium accom-
modated one thousand spectators. The judge sat on the stage with rococo
wall decorations and an ornate pipe organ at his side while the lawyers joked
about hearing musical interludes during court recesses.'
Outside the rococo "courtroom," a man breathed from an oxygen tank
while leading a demonstration of asbestos victims. Their purpose was to
remind the public that key asbestos industry officials probably knew as early
as the 1930's that asbestos caused cancer. Public records suggest that these
same industry officials conspired to manipulate medical evidence and "cover
up" asbestos hazards. Ultimately, Manville found itself besieged by nearly
seventeen thousand asbestos-related health suits, and consequently filed a
Chapter Eleven bankruptcy petition in 1982.
Today, over two million6 American industrial workers, their family mem-
bers and neighbors" are expected to die prematurely of asbestos-related
diseases.' Approximately 675,000 asbestos victims will die by the end of this
3. Pollack, Trial Over Asbestos Claims Begins, N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1985, at D8, col. 4.
4. These claims are disputed because carriers generally challenged the "occurrence" of
"bodily injury" when latent disease is at issue. The carriers argue that "bodily injury" does
not "occur" until asbestos related diseases manifest themselves with conclusive symptoms
between ten and twenty years after exposure. See Roscow and Liederman, An Overview to the
Interpretive Problems of "Occurrence" in Comprehensive General Liability Insurance, 16 FORUM
1148, 1153-54 (1981) (listing seventeen suits).
5. Galante, Megatrials, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 25, 1985, at I (over 150 lawyers expected to
participate in the proceedings).
6. Victims Get Nothing, supra note 2 ("an estimated 2,000 of the 16,500 personal-
injury plaintiffs died while Manville was haggling over its reorganization"); Comment, Asbestos
Litigation: The Dust Has Yet to Settle, 7 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 55 (1978) (citing statement by
Joseph A. Califano, former Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, reported in Hartford
Courant, Sept. 12, 1978, at I, cols. 7-8).
7. The neighbors and families of asbestos workers are also victims of "environmental
exposure." Neighbors and family members are exposed to asbestos by routine chores, such as
doing an asbestos worker's laundry. SELIKOFF, HAMMOND & SEIDMAN, MORTALITY EXPERIENCE
OF INSULATION WORKERS IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 1943-1977, 62-63 (1978).
8. Related occupational lung diseases are generally classified as inorganic pneumoconiosis
(dust exposure), organic pneumoconiosis (plant and moldy hay exposure), occupational asthmas
(toxic chemical exposure), occupational respiratory infections (bacteria, fungus, and virus
exposure), and occupational lung cancer (airborne carcinogens, such as arsenic, cobalt, nickel,
haematite, uranium, isopropyl oil, gas retort fumes, chromates, asbestos, and other silicates).
Postol, An Attorney's Guide to Occupational Lung Disease, 20 TRIAL, Feb. 1984, at 82.
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century 9-the equivalent of two hundred and sixty Bhopal disasters.' 0
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (the "Code")" lacks an express good
faith filing requirement. Currently, a tortfeasor who knew or should have
known that it was injuring employees and putting a dangerous or defective
product into the stream of commerce may, without putting good faith at
issue, file a Chapter Eleven petition to discharge tort liabilitity. This gap in
the Code directly counteracts the public policy considerations that underlie
common law product liability actions. 2 A tortfeasor in bankruptcy may
9. Geipel, Asbestos Lawsuits Paralyzed, L.A. Times, Feb. 11, 1983, § I, at 19, col. 1; see
also Reutter, Workmens' Compensation Doesn't Work or Compensate, Bus. AND Soc'Y REV.,
Fall 1980, at 39 (650,000 victims of asbestos and other occupational diseases).
10. Over 2000 people died in Bhopal, India, when lethal methyl isocyanate leaked out of a
Union Carbide chemical plant. Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public
Risk Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 278 (1985); Note, Belly Up Down in
the Dumps: Bankruptcy and Hazardous Waste Cleanup, 38 VAND. L. REv. 1037 n.l (1985);
Weisman, India Says Carbide Itself Is Responsible, N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1985, at A1S, col.
1.
11. I1 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326(1982& Supp. 1985). Chapter !1 allows a business to restructure
its debt ("reorganize") and emerge from bankruptcy as a viable and continuing business. II
U.S.C. §§ 109, 301 (1982). For an overview of Chapter 11 proceedings, see MacDonald &
Newman, Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Primer for Montana Attorneys, 43 MONT.
L. REV. I (1982).
12. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A states that:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumers or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) The seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
this product, and
(b) The user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
Thus, common law strict liability focuses on the condition of the product, not the seller's
conduct. However, most courts hold sellers strictly liable only for manufacturing and design
defects. In failure to warn cases, courts first look to the defendant's negligent conduct, i.e. the
manufacturer's or seller's good faith. A plethora of cases impose liability in failure to warn
cases when the seller knew or should have known of the need to provide warnings for product
defects. See, e.g., Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1969); Oakes v. E.I.
DuPont de Nemours and Co., Inc., 272 Cal. App. 2d 645, 77 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1969). See also
Karjala v. Johns-Manville Products Co., 523 F.2d 155, 158-59 (8th Cir. 1975) (under Min-
nesota law, failure to provide product warnings renders the product unreasonably dangerous
and subjects the manufacturer to strict liability for damages). Comment j to section 402A reads,
in pertinent part:
Directions or Warning. In order to prevent the product from being unreasonably
dangerous, the seller may be required to give directions or warning, on the container,
"as to its use. The seller may reasonably assume that those with common allergies,
as for example to eggs or strawberries, will be aware of them, and he is not required
to warn against them. Where, however, the product contains an ingredient to which
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ignore the key issues of knowledge, conduct, and product defects-the same
questions that are key in product liability litigation.
Since 1982, three solvent asbestos firms" have used Chapter Eleven of the
Code to discharge 4 their respective tort" liability for asbestos-related disease
a substantial number of the population are allergic, and the ingredient is one whose
danger is not generally known, or if known is one which the consumer would
reasonably not expect to find in the product, the seller is required to give warning
against it, if he has knowledge, or by the application of reasonable, developed
human skill and foresight should have knowledge, of the presence of the ingredient
and the danger. Likewise in the case of poisonous drugs, or those unduly dangerous
for other reasons, warnings as to use may be required.
Section 402A and comment j constitute the basis for a manufacturer's liability to the ultimate
worker or user. It remains unclear whether a manufacturer who, despite testing, could not have
reasonably foreseen the range of hazards of a product should be strictly liable.
Soon after section 402A was adopted in 1965, the Illinois Supreme Court construed 402A
liberally in Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 II1. 2d 612, 619, 210 N.E.2d 182, 186-87 (1965).
The court held that strict liability for physical harm to consumers is imposed on sellers of
defective products besides food. In contrast, negligence tolerates and assigns no liability for
unknown hazards. See Basko v. Sterling Drug Co., Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 426 (2d Cir. 1969)
(imposing liability for unknown hazards undesirable because manufacturers must have leeway
to experiment). See also Christofferson v. Kaiser Foundation Hosp., 15 Cal. App. 3d 75, 80,
92 Cal. Rptr. 825, 827 (1972) (liability for unknown hazards would "bar the very experience
which alone could give early hint of side effects of a new product"). This reasoning supports
the macabre proposition that without asbestosis and mesothelioma victims, the asbestos industry
would not have known asbestos was hazardous.
13. Hereafter "asbestos firm" refers to any type of manufacturer, wholesale distributor, or
seller of asbestos-related products. Unarco, Johns-Manville, and Amatex have all filed Chapter
II petitions. See In re UNR Industries, Inc., 29 Bankr. 741 (Bankr. N.D. III. 1983) (Unarco is
a UNR Industries subsidiary); In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 Bankr. 727, 743 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1984); In re Amatex Corp., 30 Bankr. 309 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd 37 Bankr. 613 (E.D.
Pa. 1983), rev'd, 755 F.2d 1034 (3rd Cir. 1985).
14. "Discharge" does not necessarily connote absolution. Dischargeability in bankruptcy
refers to whether or not the claims of a creditor or interested party are cognizable and adjudicable
in a bankruptcy proceeding. Under the Code, tort claims are dischargeable. See I I U.S.C.
502(c)(1982) (requiring bankruptcy court to estimate all unliquidated claims regardless of delay
to administration of estate resulting from discharge of such claims). See also II U.S.C.
§ 502(c)(1) (claims estimation), § 524 (effect of discharge) and § 1141 (discharge effect of plan
confirmation); In re UNR Industries, Inc., 725 F.2d 1111, 1116 (7th Cir. 1984) ("(A) major
change brought about by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 was to authorize the bankruptcy
court to adjudicate claimants' rights under the tort law, thus merging the tort determination
with the claim determination"). See generally II U.S.C. § 101 (1982). A "claim" under the
Code is "right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced, liquidated, matured, unmatured,
disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured or unsecured." Id. § 101(4)(A). See S. REP. No.
989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 21-22 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONo. & AD. NEWS 5787,
5807-08; H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 309 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5963, 6266. In Schweitzer v. Consolidated Rail Corporation and Reading
Company, 758 F.2d 936 (3rd Cir. 1985), the Third Circuit held that a plaintiff in a non-
asbestos-related personal injury action who had no manifest injury prior to the consummation
date of his employer's reorganization in bankruptcy did not have a dischargeable "claim"
within the meaning of the Code. The court assumed, without deciding, that a cause of action
can withstand a motion to dismiss even if the action has not accrued within the relevant
limitations period.
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through corporate reorganization.' 6 It has taken Manville over three years
to propose a reorganization plan that purports to provide adequate victim
Cf. Mooney Aircraft Corp. v. Foster, 730 F.2d 367, 375 (5th Cir. 1984). The Fifth Circuit,
interpreting Chapter VII of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, held that persons killed in an airplane
crash, five years after the assets of the airplane manufacturer had been purchased in the
bankruptcy court, did not have dischargeable claims against the debtor in prior proceedings.
Mooney may dispel the confusing proposition that a person who could not know that many
years into the future he would die at the hands of a debtor's product would need to file a
claim to the assets of the debtor's estate. In mass tort litigation, however, there may be nothing
more than an empty corporate shell available to sue by the time victims manifest conclusive
symptoms of their injuries.
15. The United States Supreme Court held in Ohio v. Kovacs, .105 S. Ct. 709 (1985), that
a hazardous waste site owner could avoid compliance with a state court injunction requiring
him to clean the waste site by filing a personal bankruptcy petition. However, the facts in
Kovacs are severely limited and the holding is narrow. In fact, the liabilities at issue were not
tort liabilities, but rather obligations to pay money. In Kovacs, the state of Ohio obtained an
injunction against Kovacs ordering him to clean up the waste site. The state subsequently
obtained the appointment of a receiver when Kovacs failed to comply with the injunction. The
receiver took possession of Kovacs' property and assets to implement the injunction. When
Kovacs filed a personal bankruptcy petition, the state moved to require Kovacs' post-bankruptcy
income to be applied to aid the receiver in cleaning up the site. The Court held that the
appointment of a receiver had converted the injunction into an obligation by Kovacs to pay
money, an obligation that is definitely dischargeable in bankruptcy. Thus, when the case reached
the Supreme Court, tort liability was not at issue. Accordingly, the Court warned that "we do
not address what the legal consequences would have been had Kovacs taken bankruptcy before
a receiver had been appointed." Id. at 711 (emphasis added). Thus, the Court expressly left
open the question of tort liability, concluding that "we do not question that anyone in possession
of the site . . . must comply with the environmental laws of the State of Ohio." Id. at 711-12.
In Kovacs, however, the respondent was not in possession of the property which gave rise to
the tort liability. Therefore, Kovacs has little bearing on the subject matter of this Comment.
In fact, the entire case is merely a necessary adjudication of financial obligation which was
unrelated to tort liability and required by the Bankruptcy Code. Accord Midatlantic Nat'l Bank
v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 106 S. Ct. 755 (1986).
16. See II U.S.C. § 502(c) (1982). Liabilities must be adjudicated in bankruptcy proceedings
regardless of their unliquidated or contingent nature. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 354 (1977); S. REP. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1978). This represents a
significant change from the old Bankruptcy Act of 1898. The change ensured that bankruptcy
proceedings give the debtor full relief which will not be defeated by an outstanding debt that
would otherwise remain unaffected by discharge. See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(l)(ii) (1982). In
theory, the Code does not distinguish personal injury claimants, banks, insurance companies,
or trade creditors. The Code's avowed, but theoretical, concern is when each claim arises, not
the nature of the claim. Claims arising from pre-petition corporate activity are treated equally,
whether they are personal injury claims or not. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1122(a) (1982), which
provides that a reorganization plan may place claims or classes of interests in a particular class,
if such a claim or interest is "substantially similar" to the other claims or interests of the class.
It is important to note that upon filing a bankruptcy petition, corporate assets become a trust
for the benefit of pre-existing claimants, which enables the trustee or debtor-in-possession to
operate the business for the benefit of those pre-existing claimants. Claims that arise subsequent
to the filing of the bankruptcy petition have priority in payment. Likewise, if a firm injures
someone due to post-petition activity, the injured party has priority in payment over the pre-
petition creditors. Thus, the Code distinguishes claimants by virtue of when their claims arise.
Asbestos firms in Chapter 11 argue that unknown claimants, exposed victims with precursor
or no symptoms, represent pre-petition claims by virtue of pre-petition inhalation of asbestos
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compensation, and another year may pass before Manville's creditors, vic-
tims, and shareholders approve a version of this plan. 7
Asbestos-related diseases are commonly occupational in nature,"s many of
which develop after latency periods of fifteen to forty years.' 9 A victim
exposed to lethal toxic agents today may not exhibit symptoms for decades,
and therefore may not recognize asbestos-related injuries until long after the
employer has gone out of business or reorganized in bankruptcy.20
particles. Therefore, these firms argue that these victims should be dealt with under their
respective organization plans.
17. See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 52 Bankr. 879 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985) (decision and
order on motions for retention of special counsel, reimbursements of expenses and summary
judgment on an issue of corporate governance). Manville objected to the shareholders' attempt
to compel a shareholders meeting in response to the proposed establishment of a trust fund
for the benefit of the tort claimants. The company argued that the shareholders had effectively
abandoned the Chapter Eleven process and used the Delaware proceeding to jeopardize Man-
ville's attempt to emerge from bankruptcy. The court enjoined the Delaware action: "If it were
not for the ongoing unwillingness of opposing factions to seek a consensual or near consensual
plan rather than risk an attempt at an imposed plan, a section 1129 confirmation hearing might
already have been held." Id.
18. The government identifies over two hundred substances as disease or cancer causing
agents. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, AN INTERIM REPORT TO CONGRESS ON OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE
(1981). There has been a considerable amount of legal literature published regarding occupational
disease which is beyond the scope of this article. For a reviewof these articles, see Black &
Lilienfield, Epidemiologic Proof in Toxic Tort Litigation, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 732 (1984);
Dworkin, Fear of Disease and Delayed Manifestation Injuries: A Solution or a Pandora's Box?
53 FORDHAM L. REV. 527 (1984); Lewis, Ocaw v. American Cyanamid; The Shrinking of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1167 (1985); Rosenberg, The Causal
Connection In Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV.
L. REV. 851 (1984); Sugarman, Symposium: Alternative Compensation Schemes and Tort
Theory: Doing A way with Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 558 (1985); Note, Employee Participation
in Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission Proceedings, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1317
(1985); Note, Occupationally Induced Cancer Susceptibility: Regulating the Risk, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 697 (1983).
19. All diseases are ultimately detectable as symptoms develop. Rarely, however, are asbes-
tosis cases ever conclusively diagnosed within a decade after initial exposure. See Selikoff,
Churg & Hammond, Asbestos Exposure and Neoplasia, 188 J. A.M.A. 22.(1964); I ASBESTOS
PROPERTIES, APPLICATION AND HAZARDS (L. Michaels & S. Chissick eds. 1979).
20. Other toxic products may also cause mass injuries, though not all mass tortfeasors have
immediately sought asylum in bankruptcy to minimize tort liability. See Schwadel, Robins Sets
$615 Million Pool to Cover Dalkon Shield Claims, Halts Dividends, Wall St. J., Apr. 3, 1985,
at 2, col. 3. (A.H. Robins Co. established $615 million reserve to cover Dalkon Shield claims
for payment to injured women over next seventeen years; creation of fund eradicated Robins'
net worth). See also A.H. Robins Loses $461.6 Million, L.A. Times, Apr. 3, 1985, IV:l, at I,
col. 2. (senior vice president and Robins' chief financial officer, G.E.R. Stiles, asserted that
"[wle are not (bankrupt) [sic] and we are not in danger of that .... We are operating today
just as we did yesterday and as we will be .... It's business as usual"). Despite the evaporation
of Robins' net worth, the company did not seek protection in bankruptcy until it first attempted
to create a fund to compensate victims of the Dalkon Shield. Robins waited to file its bankruptcy
petition until the company was convinced that the $615 million fund it created in April, 1985,
would be insufficient to cover legal fees and damages. See, e.g., Diamond, Drug Company
Asks Protection From Creditors, N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1985 at I. But see Daniels, Attempt
Seen to Block Robins Chapter 11 Move, N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1985 at 31 (victim's attorney
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Massive tort liability remains the raison d'etre2' for the asbestos bankrup-
ties because tort claims are dischargeable under the Code. 22 The Code's lack
of an express good faith filing requirement exemplifies conflicting social
policy; the goal of tort law is victim compensation, while the goal of
corporate reorganization is debtor rehabilitation. 23 Furthermore, victims have
no control over when a tortfeasor files a bankruptcy petition.
arguing that Robins attempted to exploit the bankruptcy code, in view of company's record
earnings pace in 1985). Retired district Judge Miles W. Lord accused Robins in open court of
"corporate irresponsibility as its meanest" when he accused three top Robins officials of waiting
to settle cases until the eve of trial so that Robins would earn interest on the settlement fund.
Schwadel, Robins and Plaintiffs Face Uncertain Future, N.Y. Times, Aug. 23, 1985, at 36. For
a review of the Robins litigation, see Sovern, Lord's Justice (Book Review), 35 DE PAUL L.
REV. (in print 1985) [forthcoming). Manville, however, argued that since its net worth would
be dissipated, it was functionally insolvent and, therefore, in need of reorganization. But see
Manville Should End the Nightmare, Bus. WEEK, Dec. 10, 1984, at 166 (Manville has been
reluctant to compromise its interest to settle claims without litigation).
21. Judge Lifland used the phrase "raison d'etre" in In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 Bankr.
727 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) to describe the main and only reason Manville filed a bankruptcy
petition. Id. at 730. See also Code § 362 (which automatically stays all pending litigation against
the tortfeasor and precludes new tort plaintiffs from commencing new ligitation). See Clay v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 722 F.2d 1284 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3537 (1984).
In a mass tort-based bankruptcy, the automatic stay provisions are naturally a significant benefit
to tortfeasors and a significant bar to victim compensation. Thus, the automatic stay provisions
of Code § 362 afford a Manville-like tortfeasor the "breathing room" to delay victim
compensation and create an incentive to litigate liability with insurance carriers.
22. Tort liability is dischargeable under II U.S.C. § 1141 (1982). See supra note 14.
23. See Roe, Bankruptcy and Mass Tort, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 846 n.1 (1984). Professor
Roe explains that asbestos and diethylstilbestrol (DES) catastrophes merely foreshadow a
forthcoming national problem. Citing Dr. Leon Cander, Chief of Internal Medicine, Albert
Einstein Medical Center, Professor Roe emphasizes that 8001o of the cancer diagnosed in America
is occupationally induced by carcinogens in the workplace. Thus, it may be common for a
corporate tortfeasor's aggregate liability to exceed its net worth. This disparity raises tantalizing
bankruptcy issues, because tort claimants are currently considered general unsecured creditors,
subject to priority of preferred shareholders and secured commercial creditors. If tort liability
alone exceeds the value of a tortfeasor's assets, nothing will remain for the tort victims. Most
tort victims of asbestos exposure have yet to manifest conclusive symptoms, relegating them to
the arguable status of mere "contingent" claimholders. Contingent claims are "all debts that,
either as to their existence or as to their amount, depend upon some future event uncertain
either as to its occurrence altogether -or as to the time of its occurrence." Edwards Co. Inc. v.
Long Island Trust Co., 347 N.Y.S.2d. 893, 902 (Sup. Ct. 1973) (quoting 3A COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY, § 63.30, at 1912.1 (14th ed. 1977)). Cf. II U.S.C. § 3030(b) (1982); In re UNR
Industries, Inc., 12 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 1002 (Bankr. N.D. III. 1985); In re Amatex Corp.,
755 F.2d 1034 (3d Cir. 1985) ("An involuntary case is commenced by the filing with the
bankruptcy court in petition . . . by . . . holder(s) of claim(s) against such person . . . not
contingent as to liability"). One court has reasoned that tort claims are not truly contingent as
to liability, even if they are disputed. In re Dill, 30 Bankr. 546 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1983), aff'd,
731 F.2d 629 (9th Cir. 1984). However, bankruptcy courts disagree about whether tort claims
are contingent in any respect. One line of cases holds that tort claims are not contingent as to
liability, when tortious events that give rise to the claim have already occurred. See, e.g., In re
Dill, 30 Bankr. 546 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 731 F.2d 629 (9th Cir. 1984); In re Longhorn
1979-Il Drilling Program, 32 Bankr. 923 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1983). One court ruled to the
contrary that tort claims depend upon a judicial finding of liability, and are therefore contingent.
In re Turner, 32 Bankr. 244 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1983) (expressly rejecting Dill).
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This Comment focuses on asbestos litigation to analyze the legal relation-
ships between latent disease, traditional victim compensation, and corporate
rehabilitation. Parts I and II analyze the asbestos bankruptcies, and partic-
ularly In re Johns-Manville Corp.2 4 to illustrate the present inadequacies of
the Code in the compensation of tort victims. Part III proposes an express
good faith filing requirement for tort-based reorganizations. Such a require-
ment would help courts determine whether a tortfeasor knew or should have
known, prior to filing its Chapter Eleven petition, that it was injuring
employees or putting an unreasonably dangerous or defective product into
the stream of commerce. An amendment of this sort would hold tortfeasors
in bankruptcy to the same liability standards that are crucial in non-bank-
ruptcy product liability litigation.
I. THE Manville CASE
A. Manville in Bankruptcy
The Manville Corporation filed for Chapter Eleven bankruptcy reorgani-
zation on August 26, 1982. The following day, Manville reported that its
domestic assets were virtually unencumbered, with $1.4 billion in net book
value of unmortgaged property, plants, and equipment, and $600 million in
net book value of other consolidated assets. Manville held $15 million in
cash on the day that it filed for protection from tort claimants.25 Manville's
chief executive claimed that Manville had better cash flow than any other
big company ever to file a bankruptcy petition.2 6
Nevertheless, due to an estimated thirty-five thousand potential lawsuits
at a speculated total cost of two billion dollars, Manville filed for bankruptcy.
Manville's commercial creditors27 and numerous tort claimants subsequently
filed over twenty motions to dismiss the bankruptcy petition for lack of
good faith. The challengers of the Manville petition asserted bad faith on
two grounds. First, Manville's commercial creditors argued that the com-
pany's financial condition appeared healthy. Second, the asbestos victims
argued that asbestos caused cancer, and that Manville had "covered up"
the truth.
In In re Johns-Manville Corp., the bankruptcy court denied the motions
to dismiss the petition for lack of good faith. The court concluded that
"because the allegations of the Asbestos [Victims] Committee are not sup-
ported by concrete facts ... and it is contended by Manville that it was not
until recently that the full extent of the dangers due to asbestos exposure
24. In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 Bankr. 727, 743 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) (decision and
order on motions to dismiss Manville's Chapter I I petition).
25. See Consolidated Balance Sheet filed with Chapter II Petition, In re Johns-Manville
Corp., 9 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 1403 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983).
26. Id.
27. Code § 101(9)(A) defines a creditor as an "entity that has a claim ... that arose at
the time of or before the order for relief." II U.S.C. § 101(9)(A) (1982).
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was clarified ... the Asbestos Committee has not sustained its burden of
demonstrating fraud to vitiate the filing ab initio." 28
B. Asbestos History
The bankruptcy court's conclusion in the Manville case does not comport
with either the evidence compiled by the asbestos victims or with the findings
of other courts that have heard similar evidence. The following history
highlights the evolution of scientific, legal, and lay knowledge concerning
asbestos. Specific facts regarding the actions of various corporations and
their executives are not intended as an indictment. Rather, they are merely
a recounting of a public record that illustrates the types of problems that a
good faith filing requirement in tort-based bankruptcy could solve.
Western civilization has long been aware of asbestosis. Even the first
century Romans knew that slaves who mined asbestos suffered from lung
disease and used "make shift respirator[s]" for protection. 29 A French
Department of Labor inspector linked fifty deaths to asbestos exposure in
a weaving mill in 1906.30 By 1933, Manville itself had paid $35,000 to settle
eleven asbestosis claims. 3 Until recently, however, the industry has not
acknowledged its own contribution to asbestos-related death and injury. The
widely publicized discovery of correspondence between major industry ex-
ecutives, doctors, and lawyers from the 1930's through the 1960's suggest
repeated efforts by the asbestos industry to distort evidence and hide asbestos-
related hazards. As late as 1977, Manville apparently attempted to mislead
its own shareholders on the matter in its Annual Report.32 As an appellate
court in Florida recently noted, "there is voluminous evidence that the
asbestos industries have known for decades of the dangers involved in the
use of asbestos products.""
Asbestos hazards were common knowledge as early as the 1930's. Specif-
ically, Dr. Roscoe Gray, the stirgical director for Aetna Life Insurance
Company wrote in his 1934 "Attorneys' Textbook of Medicine" that:
28. 36 Bankr. at 735.
29. D. BERMAN, DEATH ON THE JOB 84 (1978).
30. Asbestos-Related Occupational Diseases: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Com-
pensation, Health, and Safety of the Committee on Education and Labor, House of Represen-
tatives, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) (prepared statement of Kenneth W. Carlson, Esq., Asbestos
Chronological Highlights) [hereinafter cited as CHRONOLOGY]. For a historical view of the
asbestos industry and a thorough depiction of the decades-long cover-up by Manville and other
industry leaders, see Brodeur, The Asbestos Industry On Trial, 61 NEW YORKER 45 (June 17,
1985).
31. Meeting of the Board of Directors of Johns-Manville Corporation, June 26, 1933,
reprinted in CHRONOLOGY, supra note 30, at 82-83.
32. 10-K ANNUAL REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(D) OF SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT
OF 1934, JOHNS-MANVILLE CORPORATION, FISCAL YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1977, ITEM 5.
LEGAL PROCEEDINGS [hereinafter cited as ANNUAL REPORT].
33. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. v. Janssens, 463 So. 2d 242, 249 n.5 (Fla. App. 1984),
review den., 467 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 1985)
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Asbestos particles inhaled into the lung produce an exceedingly severe and
perhaps fatal inflammation .... Since asbestosis is incurable, and usually
results in total disability followed by death, care and caution should be
assumed before a claim is filed. This is a very serious disease .. .
While the surgical director for Aetna Life, then a major insurer of asbestos
firms, disseminated this material, the manufacturers denied awareness of the
disease.
On December 10, 1934, Vandiver Brown, general counsel for Manville,
wrote to Dr. A.S. Lanza, medical director of the Metropolitan Life Insurance
Company, about an article that Lanza was writing." Brown complained that
Lanza had deleted observations from a draft of the article that minimized
the gravity of asbestos-related disease. Brown wrote that "the observations
... in your original report presented an aspect of your survey that was
favorable to the industry and we should like to see them retained. ' 36 On
December 21, 1934, Brown returned Dr. Lanza's galley proofs, requesting
"that all the favorable aspects of the survey be included .... I feel confident
we can depend upon you ... to give us this 'break' . . ..,,7
One year later, in September 1935, A.S. Rossiter, editor of Asbestos
magazine,3 8 wrote to Sumner Simpson, president of Raysbestos-Manhattan.
Rossiter requested permission to report current research about asbestos-
related diseases, and acknowledged that "[always you have requested that
for certain obvious reasons we publish nothing and naturally, your wishes
have been respected." ' 39 The following October, Simpson contacted Brown
regarding Rossiter's request. Simpson stated: "I think the less said about
asbestos, the better off we are . . . ."4
Brown replied, and told Simpson that "I quite agree with you that our
interests are best served by having asbestos receive minimum publicity."' 4
Brown also advised Simpson to:
warn the editors to use North American data on the subject rather than
English .... [Tlhe clinical picture presented in North American localities
... is considerably milder than that reported in England and South Africa
42
34. CHRONOLOGY, supra note 30, at 28 (emphasis added).
35. CHRONOLOGY, supra note 30, at 29.
36. Oversight Hearings on Asbestos Health Hazards to Schoolchildren: Hearings on H.R.
1435 and H.R. 1524 Before the Subcommittee on Elementary. Secondary and Vocational
Education, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 220, 485, 492 (1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979 School Hearings];
Brodeur, supra note 30, at 73.
37. CHRONOLOGY, supra note 30, at 29.
38. AsBESTOS, published by Secretarial Service, 16th Floor, Inquirer Bldg., Philadelphia,
Pa., Sept, 1935, cited in Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 727 F.2d 506, 532 (5th Cir.
1984).
39. Id. See also The Effect of Bankruptcy Cases of Several Asbestos Companies on the
Compensation of Asbestos Victims, Subcommittee on Labor Standards of the Committee on
Education and Labor, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 48 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Bankruptcy Hearings].
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Apparently, industry officials knew of foreign studies as well as American
data. Thus, the industry's asserted denials about its awareness of asbestosis
during the 1930's now seem questionable. Additionally, the industry financed
and controlled its own research project at the Saranac Laboratories in
Saranac Lake, New York.4
3
In November, 1936, Simpson wrote to F. H. Schulter, president of Ther-
moid Rubber Co., and proposed that several asbestos manufacturers control
the Saranac Study." Each manufacturer would pay an equal share to finance
the research, and each manufacturer would ultimately help decide whether
to publish the completed results. Simpson thought that:
it would be a good thing to distribute the information among the medical
fraternity provided it is the right type and would not injure our companies
.... [Wle do know that Asbestos Fibres [sic] can, and do, get into the
lungs and may set up a Fibrosis (sic] condition .. .called asbestosis.4'
In apparent accord with Simpson's scheme, Manville's counsel, Vandiver
Brown, informed the Saranac laboratory that, "[tihe results ... will be
considered the property of those. . . advancing the funds, who will determine
whether... they shall be made public .... [Tihe manuscript of your study
will be submitted to us for approval prior to publication." The Saranac
research continued for three years. In March 1939, Simpson wrote to Rossiter
at Asbestos magazine about dust abatement; his evident intent was to
suppress the information until the Saranac research was actually completed.
Simpson wrote, "I can tell you confidentially, but I am not willing to make
it public, that the air can be kept below five million microns with proper
controls, but I am not willing to start a controversy with my competitors. 47
Rossiter seems to have followed Simpson. On March 23, 1939, Rossiter
apparently agreed to suppress the preliminary Saranac research, finding
"[tihe information ... most interesting. Of course we understand that all
this information on asbestos is to be kept confidential and that nothing
should be published by Asbestos at present. ' 48 Indeed, Manville attorney
Brown apparently adopted the same silence when he confessed that, "I have
in mind .. . the ostrich-like attitude which has been evinced from time to
time by some members of the industry. '49
Similar attitudes prevailed within Manville itself. In 1949, Dr. Kenneth
Smith conducted Manville's own survey of 708 employees. X-ray results
43. The manufacturers involved in this arrangement were Johns-Manville Corp., Raysbestos-
Manhattan, Inc., Thermoid Rubber Co., Southern Asbestos, Russell Manufacturing, American
Brake Block Corp., Gatke Corp., United States Gypsum Co., Keasbey & Mattison Asbestos
Manufacturing (now Nicolet Industries, Inc.), and United Asbestos & Rubber Co. CHRONOLOGY,
supra note 30, at 30.
44. CHRONOLOGY, supra note 30, at 30.
45. Id.
46. CHRONOLOGY, supra note 30, at 31; Brodeur, supra note 30, at 75-76.
47. CHRONOLOGY, supra note 30, at 31 (emphasis added).
48. Id.
49. Id.
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showed that seventy-five percent of the employees sampled displayed lung
fibrosis. 0 The survey indicated that the increase in fibrosis of the lung was
directly proportional to the length of exposure. The survey also found another
475 employees with early signs of non-specific fibrosis, "all of whom will
show progressive fibrosis if allowed to continue working in dusty areas."',
Dr. Smith insisted in the report that the employees should not be told of
their illness. Rather, Smith reasoned that:
as long as the man feels well, is happy at home and at work, and his
physical condition remains good, nothing should be said . . . . [Als long
as the man is not disabled .. . the Company can benefit by his many
years of experience.,
Finally, when Dr. Irving Selikoff's independent 1964 study53 of 1,500
asbestos workers showed a high incidence of cancer, asbestos firms began
to provide warnings on their products. Regardless, the leading asbestos
products liability decision at that time held that these warnings were useless.
In Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp.,5 4 the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals insisted that:
none of the so called "cautions" intimated the gravity of the risk: the
danger of a fatal illness caused by asbestosis and mesothelioma or other
cancers. The mild suggestion that inhalation of asbestos in excessive quan-
tities over a long period of time "may be harmful" conveys no idea of
the extent of the danger. The admonition that a worker should "avoid
breathing the dust" is black humor. There was no way for insulation
workers to avoid breathing asbestos dust."
Despite Manville's decision to hide the adverse results of its own medical
survey from company employees, Manville published the following charac-
terization of what the company and the industry knew about asbestos
hazards. Manville's fiscal year Annual Report for 1977, filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission, reassured the shareholders that,
[t]here was no basis for any warning until publication of scientific studies
in 1964 .... The company believes that.., during the periods of injurious
exposure, the Company, government officials and medical and scientific
studies believed the dust levels to which asbestos insulation workers were
exposed presented no appreciable hazard to the health of such workers
56
Although the history of the asbestos industry raises obvious problems of
good faith, these issues are irrelevant to the filing of the petition in a tort-
based bankruptcy.
50. Id. at 117.
51. Id.
52. Id. (emphasis added).
53. Id. at 50. See Selikoff, Churg, and Hammond, The Occurrence of Asbestosis Among
Insulation Workers, 132 ANN. NEW YORK ACAD. 139 (1965).
54. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 869 (1974).
55. 493 F.2d at 1104.
56. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 32, at Item 5. Legal Proceedings (emphasis added).
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II. BANKRUPTCY ANALYSIS AND IMPACT
Current toxic tort litigation 7 illustrates that large corporations may face
financial ruin if they are liable for placing defective products into the stream
of commerce. Unfortunately, the prospective insolvency of major corpora-
tions currently presents conflicts" between corporate rehabilitation and victim
compensation. This is especially true when plaintiffs uncover overwhelming
evidence of dubious corporate conduct prior to the corporation's filing of a
bankruptcy petition. 9
The asbestos bankruptcies raise the issue of whether corporations may
reasonably file for reorganization 6w without good faith, simply to avoid tort
liability. This is problematic because the Code gives tort claimants less
protection than contract creditors. 6'
57. Asbestos suits are only one example of "toxic tort" litigation. See, e.g., In re Northern
District of California "Dalkon Shield" IUD Product Liability Litigation, 521 F. Supp. 1188
(N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated and remanded, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1171 (1983) (defective contraceptives); Drayton v. Jiffee Chem. Group., 591 F.2d 352 (6th Cir.
1978) (drain cleaner with sulfuric acid); Dougherty v. Hooker Chem. Corp., 540 F.2d 174 (3d
Cir. 1976) (solvent with trichloroethylene); Olgers v. Sika Chem. Corp., 437 F.2d 90 (4th Cir.
1971) (epoxy resin with diethylene triamine); Skogen v. Dow Chemical Co., 375 F.2d 692 (8th
Cir. 1967) (insecticide with organic phosphate); Heritage v. Pioneer Brokerage and Sales, Inc.,
604 P.2d 1059 (Alaska 1979) (mobile home with formaldehyde); Renfroe v. Eli Lilly and Co.,
686 F.2d 642 (8th Cir. 1982) (daughter's cancer caused by mother's ingestion of DES while
pregnant); Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 2d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132,
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980) (DES case).
58. Compensation of tort victims may leave the tortfeasor without assets. In In re UNR
Industries, Inc., 29 Bankr. 741 (Bankr. N.D. Il1. 1983), Judge Hart cryptically observed, "The
Court is not unaware that in refusing to approve of a procedure by which the right of putative
claimants would be adjudicated and cut off, the putative claimants may wind up with judgments
against corporations with only one asset: a corporate charter." Id. at 748. Bankruptcy also
accelerates unmatured contract claims but not unmatured tort claims. II U.S.C. §§ 502(b),
726, l129(a)(7)(A) (1982); H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 353 (1977), reprinted in
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6309.
59. Numerous "cover-ups" of incriminating research indicating product hazards have oc-
curred. For example, Dow Chemical Co. suppressed benzene data and withheld evidence of
safety problems from the government. See Blumenthal, Files Show Dioxin Makers Knew of
Hazards, N.Y. Times, July 16, 1983, at i, col. 2. See also Occupational Diseases and Their
Compensation, Byssinosis, Radiation and Hearing Loss; Hearings Before the Job Comm. on
Labor Standards of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, Part 3, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
14-41 (1979) (statement of Sol Stein) (Textile Manufacturers Institute suppressed byssinosis
data); Toxic Substances Control Act; Hearings on S.776 Before the Subcommittee on the
Environment of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Part 1, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 62 (1975)
(statement of Dr. Daniel Pertshok) (Rohn & Hass suppressed BCME data); N. ASHFORD, CRISIS
IN THE WORK PLACE 11 (1976) (employers have prevented independent researchers from gathering
information on the extent of various health hazards); Roblee, The Dark Side of Worker's
Compensation: Burdens and Benefits in Occupational Disease Coverage, 2 INDUs. REL. L.J.
596, 607 (1978) (early attempts to study brown lung disease thwarted by mill owners' refusal
to allow independent occupational health scientists access to plants and records).
60. Though culpability is generally not germane to bankruptcy analysis, this Comment
suggests that culpability should be a key issue in tort-based reorganizations.
61. Code § 101(9)(A) defines "creditor" as an "entity that has a claim against the debtor
that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor." II U.S.C. §
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Commercial creditors may minimize financial exposure to the risk of a
debtor's bankruptcy by taking a priority security interest, or by bargaining
for favorable terms in a security agreement that provides for default or non-
payment of debt. 62 Contract creditors extend credit voluntarily. This bar-
gaining process allows commercial contract creditors to make intelligent
decisions about extending credit. However, tort victims are involuntary
claimants who cannot minimize toxic exposure; they do not rely upon
contracts or agreements. Rather, tort victims recover damages based solely
upon common law principles designed to prevent personal harm. Tort victims
do not bargain for the risks they unwittingly take before they are injured.
While employees as tort victims do bear the implied risk that employers may
become insolvent, they do not assume an implied risk that employers may
subject them to industrial fallout from dangerous and defective products. 63
Those risks are protected by the tort system. Because social policy rather
than contract law imposes the duty violated by tortfeasors, the Code should
subject tortfeasors to traditional tort policies at a preliminary stage in a
bankruptcy.
101(9)(A) (1982). The Code appears to treat all claimants equally. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 989,
95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5792 ("The
Committee feels that the policy of the bankruptcy law is to provide a fresh start .... Bankruptcy
is designed to provide an orderly liquidation procedure under which all creditors are treated
equally"). See also II U.S.C. § 362 (1982) (equitable treatment of creditors underlies the
automatic stay provisions); II U.S.C. § 547 (1982) (preference procedures); II U.S.C. § 507
(1982) (priority procedures). However, even if a culpable tortfeasor is granted relief from tort
liability in reorganization, the tort victim is not guaranteed compensation when the new firm
emerges. See il U.S.C. § 1141(c) (1982) ("After confirmation ... the property ... is free and
clear of all claims ... of creditors"). The Code likewise provides that "confirmation of a plan
... discharges the debtor from any debt that arose before the date of such confirmation." I I
U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1) (1982). The Code's bias toward commercial creditors is evidenced by the
fact that most tort claims were not provable in bankruptcy before the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978 was enacted. Old Code § 103 governed the "provability" of claims in bankruptcy, but
has since been deleted. II U.S.C. § 103 (1976) (repealed 1978). A discharge in bankruptcy
under old Code § 35(a) released a debtor from all provable debts with some exceptions. Id. at
§ 35(a). Tort claims were provable only if reduced to a judgment owed at the time of filing.
Id. at § 103(a)(i).
62. Uniform Commercial Code, 3-3A U.L.A. (1985); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK
OF LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, § 23-1-20.
63. For a modern court to imply that tort victims assume this risk would be a medieval
return to the doctrine of assumption of risk. In Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493
F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974), the court stated (hat:
none of the so called "cautions" intimated the gravity of the risk: the danger of a
fatal illness caused by asbestosis and mesothelioma or other cancers. The mild
suggestion that inhalation of asbestos in excessive quantities over a long period of
time "may be harmful" conveyed no idea of the extent of the danger. The
admonition that a worker should "avoid breathing the dust" is black humor: There
was no way for insulation workers to avoid breathing asbestos dust.
Id. at 1104 (on petition for rehearing and petition for rehearing en banc) (emphasis in original).
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A. Good Faith Filing Requirements or No Faith at All?
The Code lacks an express good faith filing requirement. 4 Many courts,
however, generally imply such a requirement. 6  Code Section 1112 66 lists
various grounds for "cause" to dismiss a bankruptcy petition. 67 The list is
not exhaustive 68 and bankruptcy courts have individual discretion to deter-
mine dismissal for. cause depending on the circumstances of each case. 69
"Good faith" may be challenged under the aegis of abuse of bankruptcy
jurisdiction. 70 Abuse commonly arises from the protean schemes of cunning
petitioners to circumvent Code restrictions when the true economic need to
reorganize is lacking. 71
Analogizing the case law72 to the Manville petition, the asbestos victims
64. Code § 301 governs the filing of a voluntary petition. The section contains no express
good faith filing requirement and states that:
A voluntary case under a chapter of this title is commenced by the filing with the
bankruptcy court, a petition under such chapter by an entity that may be a debtor
under such chapter. The commencement of a voluntary case under a chapter of
this title constitutes an order for relief under this chapter.
11 U.S.C. § 301 (1982).
65. The case annotations to Code § 301 state that good faith is an implied filing requirement.
See, e.g., In re Victory Constr. Co., 3 C.B.C. 2d 655 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1981). But see In re
Eden Assoc., 13 Bankr. 578 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981); Banque de Financement v. First Nat'l
Bank of Boston, 568 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1977); In re Northwest Recreational Activities, Inc., 4
Bankr. 36 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980).
66. I1 U.S.C. § 1112 (1982). This section is entitled "Conversion or Dismissal." § 1112(b)
outlines the bases that a court may use, in its discretion, to convert a case to Chapter 7
liquidation, or dismiss the petition for abuse of bankruptcy jurisdiction.
67. See generally In re Cook, 104 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1939) (attempt to escape state court
proceeding); In re ZED, Inc., 20 Bankr. 462 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1982) (forming a debtor solely
to obtain an automatic stay of foreclosure); In re G-2 Realty Trust, 6 Bankr. 549 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1980) (transferring property from an ineligible entity to one able to file petition to
circumvent foreclosure sale); In re Eden Assoc., 13 Bankr. 578 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) (shielding
assets of investor's healthier companies from bankruptcy jurisdiction); In re Nancant, Inc., 8
Bankr. 1005 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981) (forestalling tax liability by requesting that bankruptcy
court determine liability, without real need to reorganize); In re Century City, Inc., 8 Bankr.
25 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1980) (filing for reorganization with an absence of real debt and real
creditors); In re Alison Corp., 9 Bankr. 827 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1981) (using bankruptcy courts
to recoup investment and obtain profit in lieu of foreclosure proceeding); In re Century City,
Inc., 8 Bankr. 25 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1980) (attempt to recapture property transferred to creditors);
In re Fast Food Properties, Ltd., 5 Bankr. 539 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1980) (using bankruptcy
courts to frustrate enforcement of power of sale provisions under deed of trust).
68. In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 Bankr. 727, 743 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984).
69. But see, e.g., In re Eden Assoc., 13 Bankr. 578, 584 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) ("slavish
adherence" to good faith may prejudice putative claimants who may be beneficiaries of debtor's
assets).
70. See supra note 67.
71. Id.
72. The Asbestos Committee cited cases at supra note 67, specifically In re Century City,
Inc., 8 Bankr. 25 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1980) (abuse of bankruptcy jurisdiction by filing petition
without real creditors and real debts).
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in In re Johns-Manville Corp.7" argued that, prior to filing, Manville lacked
sufficient debts to warrant reorganization. Indeed, the Manville filing, not
its solvent pre-petition financial condition, triggered acceleration of $700
million in real debt. First, simply filing the Manville bankruptcy petition
accelerated $275 million in unsecured and institutional debt. 74 Second, Man-
ville's commercial creditors were forced to file claims for an additional $425
million of liquidated debt. 71
In effect, Manville accelerated enough immediate debt to create the real
need to reorganize. When the Asbestos Committee and nineteen other re-
spondents challenged the Manville petition, Manville successfully argued that
if the court dismissed the petition, then the company would remain liable
for all its real (but self-accelerated) debts. 76 Manville asserted that its cash
and liquid assets were insufficient to pay those obligations. Manville con-
vinced the bankruptcy court, and the district court on appeal, that the
company had "real debt, real creditors, and a compelling need to reorganize
to meet those obligations. ' 77
The courts accepted Manville's circular argument. First, if Manville had
not filed a bankruptcy petition, $275 million in unsecured and institutional
debt would have remained unaccelerated. Second, Manville would have
presumably discharged its $425 million in commercial debt under its pre-
petition credit arrangements. Instead, Manville used the bankruptcy petition
itself as a device to create the need to reorganize. Only after the petition
accelerated $700 million in real debt did Manville truly need the aid of the
bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy petition itself rearranged Manville's debt
structure, thereby leaving the company unable to pay its consequently ma-
tured debt.7 1
Nevertheless, the bankruptcy court distinguished a primary case upon
which the challengers of the Manville petition relied. In Tucker v. Texas
73. 36 Bankr. 727, 743 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984).
74. It is important to remember that Manville filed a voluntary Chapter II petition, pursuant
to II U.S.C. §§ 109, 301 (1982), under which no solvency requirement exists. Contingent
indebtedness is not a bar to filing for relief in Chapter I1. Contingent and unliquidated claims
can be administered in bankruptcy. I I U.S.C. § 502(c) (1982). Debts are-administered in Chapter
II regardless of this unliquidated or contingent nature. This represents a change from the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898. The purpose of this change is to ensure that a bankruptcy proceeding
fully relieves debtors despite debts which would otherwise be unaffected by reorganization.
Further, and most important, the mere filing of a bankruptcy petition accelerates unmatured
debts.
75. Manville's commercial creditors would lose their right to recover liquidated debts if they
did not file claims in the bankruptcy proceeding. See also II U.S.C. 501(c) (1982) (debtor may
file proofs of claim on behalf of creditors who do not timely file). Presumably, whether or not
the liquidated claimholders voluntarily filed proofs of claim, Manville could have filed on their
behalf, and accelerated debts that otherwise were not due.
76. 36 Bankr. at 740.
77. Id.
78. 36 Bankr. at 740. The court rescued Manville's solvency argument by claiming that
"[u]pon dismissal of this petition, Manville may be liable in the amount of all of the above-
described real debts, plus interest." Id.
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American Syndicate,79 the bankruptcy court held that a solvent debtor did
not require bankruptcy protection. 0 In Tucker, a landowner and developer
filed a voluntary reorganization petition, asserting an inability to pay their
debts as the debts matured. Like the debtor in Tucker, Manville argued that
if the asbestos victims' potential tort claims ever matured, the company
would be unable to carry or discharge its total real debt that matured by
filing a bankruptcy petition.8" On appeal in Tucker, the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals held that the debtor, like Manville, was solvent; the court found
that the debtor had discharged debts not yet due to qualify as a debtor who
is unable to pay its current debts.8 2
Thus, in Tucker, the Fifth Circuit held that a debtor's discharge of debts
not due, in order to qualify as a debtor with real creditors, was an abuse
of bankruptcy jurisdiction."3 The bankruptcy court in Manville distinguished
Tucker, even though Manville used the bankruptcy petition to accelerate
debts not due to qualify as a debtor with real creditors. The bankruptcy
court's response to Tucker was that "it has not been established .. . that
Manville has the ability to manage in full all its present liquidated and
unliquidated obligations. 8 4 The court's analysis mischaracterizes "present"
obligations by including the urgent debts that Manville created for itself by
filing the petition.
In the first paragraph of the opinion, the bankruptcy court readily ac-
knowledged that:
the sole factor necessitating [Manville's] filing is the mammoth problem
of uncontrolled proliferation of asbestos health suits brought againt it
because of its substantial use for many years of products containing
asbestos which injured those who came into contact with the dust of this
lethal substance.'5
Nonetheless, the bankruptcy court concluded that the Manville petition did
not lack good faith, particularly because Manville intended to establish some
sort of "claims-handling facility" as part of its reorganization plan. 6 There
is, however, a disturbing undercurrent beneath the court's reasoning. If
Manville intended to establish a claims-handling facility for asbestos victims,
it is curious that the company first attempted to discharge the tort liability
in bankruptcy.8 7 With a pre-petition net worth of $2.15 billion, Manville
79. 170 F.2d 939 (5th Cir. 1948).
80. Id. at 940.
81. 36 Bankr. at 740.
82. 170 F.2d at 940.
83. Id.
84. 36 Bankr. at 740.
85. Id. at 729.
86. Id. at 742. However, Manville engaged in fervent discovery litigation which, whether
intended or not, frustrated the establishment of a claims-handling facility. See infra note 96.
87. A primary reason that a firm seeks the protection of the bankruptcy law is to freeze
collection efforts by creditors by virtue of the automatic stay. However, some firms have
established compensation funds without bankruptcy. See supra note 20.
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could have established some sort of "claims-handling facility" before it filed
for bankruptcy, rather than accelerating $700 million of liquidated debt.
Manville could doubtless have appropriated a financially reasonable portion
of its assets and future earnings to purchase annuities or establish a trust to
finance a "claims-handling facility."8 Yet, instead of finding bad faith, the
court upheld the Manville petition, concluding that the company had not
abused bankruptcy jurisdiction.89
Additionally, the bankruptcy court narrowly held that the good faith
inquiry is germane only to the confirmation of the reorganization plan.' In
support of this holding, the court identified "open access" 9 as a primary
goal of the federal bankruptcy system. Citing legislative authority,92 the court
rigidly stated that the Congressional purpose was to "encourage resort to
the bankruptcy process." 93
It is nevertheless difficult to reconcile Congress's intended use of the
bankruptcy laws with recent judicial observations about Manville or similar
tortfeasors. In Johns-Manville Sales Corp. v. Janssens,94 the appellate court
of Florida upheld a punitive damage award against Manville for the following
reason:
Johns-Manville learned of the high probability of danger to thousands of
persons manufacturing and using asbestos products over a period of years
and, despite such knowledge, made conscious decisions at the executive
level not to disclose the presence of this danger nor to alert affected
individuals to the potential harm that could result from such exposure
over a long period of time. Johns-Manville's conduct .. .is clearly of a
character evincing a reckless disregard for human life or the safety of
persons exposed to its dangerous effect, which supports a finding by a
jury of a conscious indifference to consequences, wantonness, recklessness,
and a grossly careless disregard for the safety and welfare of members of
the public. '"
88. For a discussion of various financial devices available to establish some sort of claims
handling facility, see Roe, supra note 23, at 866-75.
89. 36 Bankr. at 737. Judge Lifland stated that "there is no strict and absolute 'good faith'
predicate to filing a Chapter I petition." Id. But see In re Victory Constr. Co., 9 Bankr.
549, 563-65 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1981) (good faith is an implied filing requirement).
90. Id. at 743. "(T]he type of plan which emerges, i.e., whether or not (the plan) treats
... future claimants fairly, if at all, is irrelevant to the threshold determination .. .as to the
'good faith' of Manville's filing." 36 Bankr. at 743. The court's reasoning is backwards. The
issue at this juncture of the bankruptcy proceeding was whether Manville filed the petition in
good faith, not whether the subsequent plan treats victims fairly. Thus, the propriety of the
plan is irrelevant to the propriety of the filing because good faith in plan should presuppose
good faith in filing the petition initially.
91. Id. at 736.
92. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, PART
II, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93rd Cong., Ist Sess. 75, 79 (1973); H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 220 (1977).
93. 36 Bankr. at 736.
94. 463 So. 2d at 249.
95. Id. Similarly, in Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., No. 82-4285, slip opin. (5th
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In a bankruptcy court, however, a tortfeasor's previous conduct is not
germane to the court's jurisdiction. When thousands of victimized employees
finally sued the company, Manville accelerated sufficient debt to warrant a
present need to reorganize, convincing a bankruptcy court and district court
that the company's bankruptcy petition did not lack "good faith," '96 but
instead deserved open access to the bankruptcy system.
The ruling in In re Johns-Manville Corp.97 reduces the bankruptcy courts
to halls of corporate justice. The court's rigid application of the Code and
severely narrow reliance on legislative authority illustrate that judicial dis-
cretion in tort-based bankruptcies is susceptible to abuse. Tort claims are
unlike contract claims. Commercial creditors may lose money, but tort
claimants lose their careers, their health, and their lives.
Cir. January 22, 1986), while upholding a punitive damage award for the reasonable probability
of contracting cancer in the future and related mental distress, the Fifth Circuit commented
that "the jury might also have concluded that the asbestos companies' practices of directing
their doctors not to participate in programs devoted to learning the association between asbestos
and lung-related disease reflected malicious behavior or reckless indifference to the rights of
those workers- who would be around asbestos."
96. See, e.g., In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 Bankr. 743, 745 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984). The
court conceded, "but for this continually evolving albeit amorphous constituency land mammoth
problem of uncontrolled proliferation of asbestos health suits], it is clear that an otherwise
economically robust Manville would not have commenced these reorganization proceedings."
Additionally, Manville engaged in fervent discovery wars, apparently to frustrate, rather than
to establish, a "claims-handling facility." See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 42 Bankr. 362, 364
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) (Manville opposing order to produce market share data from 1930's
to present, needed by Manville's insurance carrier to determine the appropriate contribution to
the claims handling facility); see also In re Johns-Manville Corp., 39 Bankr. 659, 661 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1984). Manville successfully fought to bar ex-employees' discovery requests for medical
and employment histories under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1982), arguing that even if an ex-employee
contracted asbestos-related diseases from exposure at Manville's plants, "Manville's financial
resources would go to discovery litigation at the expense of claimants and that the energies of
the Bankruptcy Judge and bankruptcy counsel would be diverted from the central issue of the
reorganization."
97. 36 Bankr. 743. Perhaps Manville filed for bankruptcy to put pressure on Congress. See
Release to Shareholders, Employees, Customers, Suppliers, and Creditors, Corporate Relations
Department, Manville Corporation, Wall Street J., Aug. 26, 1982, at 25 (advertisement):
Q: Your businesses are in good shape, but you filed under Chapter 11? Why?
A: We're overwhelmed by 16,500 lawsuits related to the health effects of asbestos,
with many more projected. The federal government has refused to admit its re-
sponsibility to shipyard workers. Congress has failed to act to provide compensation
for claimants....
Q: Isn't there some other national program for people injured on the job?
A: There are programs in other industries, but not for asbestos workers. There
should be a statutory compensation program for asbestos injuries. We've tried to
get a program passed but Congress has been preoccupied. This is another reason
we've been forced into Chapter I1. No other country uses the court litigation system
to provide compensation for occupational disease.
Id. (emphasis in original). See generally In re Johns-Manville Corp., No. 82 Civ. 8189 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 22, 1983) (Manville petition delayed payment to tort claimants while company litigated
disputes with insurance carriers). Nearly four years later Manville still believes Congress should
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III. SOLUTIONS
Solving the toxic tort debacle will be a long process. Asbestos litigation is
currently as cancerous as the diseases themselves, consuming significant
public resources98 while settling very little. Defendants like Manville and
their insurance carriers do not hurriedly compensate thousands of claimants
without protracted litigation. Today, toxic tort trials have become media
spectacles and feasts for what some critics might call carrion attorneys.9 At
the very least, Congress should amend the current Code specifically to address
tort-based bankruptcies in which victims of latent diseases are the primary
claimants of the debtor's estate. An express good faith filing requirement
for tort-based bankruptcies would help determine whether a tortfeasor knew
or should have known, prior to filing its bankruptcy petition, that it was
putting an unreasonably dangerous or defective product into the stream of
commerce."o
The Code currently permits a culpable tortfeasor like Manville to com-
mence and maintain a voluntary bankruptcy case because the Code lacks an
compensate claimants. See Prokesch, Talking Business with McKinney of Manville, N.Y.
Times, July 8, 1986, at 30, cols. 1-3:
Q: You are still trying to force the Government, in lawsuits and in Congress, to
help compensate asbestos-health victims. What are the chances of Congress passing
such legislation?
A: It's not difficult to convince Senators and Congressmen that it's unfair for
industry to pay for the consequences of the acts of government. But to phrase it
simply, it's not enough to be right in Washington.
98. See Tracy, How to Milk Money From a Bankrupt, FORTUNE, May 14, 1984, at 130.
The Manville bankruptcy necessitated legal services from thirty-seven law firms, which together
billed over $25 million. The two investment firms retained by bankruptcy Judge Lifland,
Morgan Stanley and First Boston, billed Manville $125,000 per month to evaluate the reorgan-
ization plan and estimate Manville's liquidation value. "Until all this is finally worked out, the
claimants will go right on waiting while the law firms and investment bankers go right on
collecting." Id. at 130.
99. Judges and journalists frequently attack plaintiffs' attorneys for pursuing their own
interests, rather than the interests of their clients. See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 Bankr.
743, 749 n.3 (1984) (Asbestos Committee composed primarily of lawyers who "have their own
financial interests in the proceedings emanating from their contingency fee arrangements" and
who "restrict their collective focus upon their own parochial interests").
Cf. Orangemail." Why It Got Paid, N.Y. Times, Mar., 1985 (editorial). The editorial praised
Federal Judge Weinstein for protecting the Agent Orange settlement fund from plaintiffs' at-
torneys, on the ground that their case was baseless: "[Ilt is totally uncertain whether any serious
adverse health effects could have been caused by the level of Agent Orange exposure veterans
might have received in Vietnam." See also Margolick, Anti-Smoking Climate Is Encouraging
Suits Against the Tobacco Industry, N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1985, at 5, col. 1. John F. Banzhaf
3d, professor at George Washington University Law School, commented that "[ylou can use
whatever analogy you want-flies to honey, vampires to blood-but we've got a glut of lawyers
out there just looking for someone to sue . . . . [S]uits agains the tobacco companies will
soon make other toxic tort cases, like Agent Orange, asbestos or DES, look like preliminary
bouts before the heavyweight match." Id.
100. Although in "normal" bankruptcies, good faith is an elastic concept to be construed
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express good faith filing requirement. Courts are unclear as to whether the
Code contains an implied good faith filing requirement.'0 '
In In re Johns-Manville Corp., the bankruptcy court held that good faith
is germane to plan confirmation under Code Section 1129(a)(3), which states
in pertinent part:
(a) The court shall confirm a plan only if all the following requirements
are met:
(1) The plan complies with the applicable provisions of this title
(3) The plan has been proposed in good faith and not by means
forbidden by law.
The legislative history to Section 1129 states that "applicable" provisions
relate to the provisions of the entire title.10 2 Contrary to the Manville court's
interpretation of Section 1129, nothing in the legislative history suggests that
good faith is the exclusive concern of section 1129(a).1°3
One such "applicable" provision under 1129(a)(1) is Section 301, which
states that good faith is an implicit prerequisite to the filing of a Chapter
Eleven case. Therefore, when Section 1129(a)(1) is read in conjunction with
the implied good faith requirement in Section 301, the holding in In re
Johns-Manville Corp. is unsupported. In fact, the court did not cite one
case that supported the proposition that good faith is not germane to the
filing of a bankruptcy petition, nor any precedent to support the corollary-
that good faith is germane only to plan confirmation.
Thus, the asbestos bankruptcies, and particularly Manville, highlight the
need for Congress to eliminate ambiguities in the Code regarding good faith.
Congress should regulate the filing of tort-based bankruptcies by amending
Code Section 301 to include an express good faith filing requirement for
tortfeasors. The amendment would be simple and narrow, adding to current
Section 301 the following modification:
on a case by case basis, good faith should be a strict prerequisite when the majority of
prospective claimants are tort victims. But see In re Eden Associates, 13 Bankr. 578, 584
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) ("slavish" adherence to a good faith concept may redound to the
detriment of those non-debtor claimants who are or may putatively be beneficiaries of the
reorganization process); Banque de Financement v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 568 F.2d 911
(2d Cir. 1977) (courts should not dismiss a Chapter I I case where the debtor has any significant
prospect of successfully reorganizing its real debt); In re Northwest Recreational Activities,
Inc., 4 Bankr. 36, 39 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980) (dismissal for lack of good faith is not expressly
required by the new Code).
101. Some courts have concluded that "good faith" is not implied by the Code. See, e.g.,
In re Eden Associated, 13 Bankr. 578, 584 (1981); In re Northwest Recreational Activities, Inc.,
4 Bankr. 36, 39 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980); Banque de Financement v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston,
568 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1977). On the other hand, the cases annotated in the current Code state
that "good faith" is an implied filing requirement. In re Victory Constr. Co., 9 Bankr. 549
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1981), modified in part, 9 Bankr. 570, vacated on other grounds, 9 Bankr.
222 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1984).
102. H.R. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 412 (1977); S.R. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 126 (1978).
103. See generally II U.S.C. § 1129 (1982) (no reference to good faith as exclusive concern
of Code § 1129).
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Current Section 301 - Voluntary Cases.
A voluntary case under a chapter of this title is commenced by the filing
with the bankruptcy court, a petition under such chapter by an entity that
may be a debtor under such chapter. The commencement of a voluntary




(A) A voluntary case under a chapter of this title is commenced in
response to stipulated or alleged prospective tort liability arising from any:
(1) accidents in which the petitioner is involved; or
(2) products liability claims, present or future;. or
(3) any other incident or occurrence which inflicts or may
inflict personal injury or property damage upon petitioner's
employees, product users, or ultimate consumers of petition-
er's products, services, or any form of property; and
(B) In any such case within subsection (A), the filing must be in good
faith, whereas the petitioner must expressly state under oath that:
(1) petitioner had no knowledge of any design defect,
nor the necessity to warn of any other defect in its product
or service; or
(2) petitioner could not have known of any defect, nor
that its product or service was unreasonably dangerous
to employers, users, and ultimate consumers; and
(C) In any such case within subsection (A) and (B), in which the petitioner
expressly states under oath that such petition is in good faith, a rebuttable
presumption of validity and truth arises upon filing wherein any opponent
of the petition may file objections to the petition, wherein such opponent
may show in full adversary proceedings that on the day of the filing,
petitioner knew or should have known the product or service giving rise to
stipulated or alleged prospective tort liability was defective or unreasonably
dangerous to employees, users, or ultimate consumers, or to the property
of such parties; and
(D) The court shall dismiss or convert to a liquidation proceeding under
Chapter 7, any petition for any such case under subsections (A), (B), and
(C), upon sufficient rebuttal of the good faith presumption by any or all
the opponents of a petition.
CONCLUSION
Today, complex trials commence between asbestos manufacturers and their
insurance carriers, in which billions of dollars of disputed insurance claims
[Vol. 35:161
1985] TOXIC TORT LIABILITY IN BANKRUPTCY 183
are at stake. Liability for product-related disease is so great that some
manufacturers have sought protection of the bankruptcy laws. Millions of
dollars are paid monthly to the lawyers. But asbestos victims wait idly by,
paying their own legal fees and medical expenses while manufacturers and
insurance companies litigate firm assets away. The Bankruptcy Code cur-
rently permits a solvent tortfeasor that knew or should have known it was
injuring employees and putting a dangerous or defective product into the
stream of commerce to file a bankruptcy petition. The Code should include
an express good faith filing requirement for tortfeasors in an effort to
balance bankruptcy subtleties with time-honored common law notions of
good faith.
Michael K. Sweig

